On 20 October Italy’s defence minister, Guido Crosetto, put the riots in Milan down to hybrid warfare. By that evening his own ministry had conceded that it had no hard evidence of any such thing. The next day, in St Petersburg, Steve Witkoff was hammering out a new round of talks with Vladimir Putin. Before that, the American envoy had gone over proposals for a settlement with Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders in Oslo. After the St Petersburg meeting the Kremlin said it was ready to resume talks between Russia, the United States and Ukraine in November. On the agenda: how to guarantee the security of all sides once the war is over.
However the talks end, Russia will remain part of Europe’s security landscape, and Europe has as much riding on their success as anyone sitting at the table. The Americans managed both meetings in the space of two days. On the European side, though, there is a widening gap between the need to come to terms with Moscow and the habit of invoking its name whenever events become awkward to explain. How do you sell citizens on a deal with a state that only yesterday was supposed to have a boundless capacity to meddle in their lives?
Someone Else to Blame
This week Russia’s name surfaced against a backdrop of smashed shop windows and street battles in Italy. Crosetto linked the unrest in Milan and other cities to a hybrid war being waged through social media. Outside forces, as he told it, have spent years working on young people, reshaping how they see the world and what they think is acceptable behaviour.
It was Marta Ottaviani who reported the ministry’s denial. Even so, the very next day she published a piece on Russian information operations around protests in Europe, blaming Moscow for the cost of living, the housing crisis, migration and a string of other social ills.
And so the Milan riots acquire a convenient foreign author. Social problems and injustice become Moscow’s handiwork, and in that version of events the question of why the anger built up in the first place, and what the government plans to do about it, quietly slips out of view.
Russian information operations are real, and European intelligence services have documented them more than once. But not even the slickest social media campaign can push up rents in Milan. The question is not whether Moscow interferes. It is how much pent-up discontent can be laid at its door.
Social policy, the state of the cities and the running of public services are the job of national governments. It is odd, to say the least, when citizens who ask about problems that have been piling up are told that it is all down to foreign influence on their minds. Over time such grievances get recast as a security matter, and a quarrel with the government is easily painted as doing Moscow’s bidding.
Guilty of Talking
Much the same reflex is at work in diplomacy. Any easing of pressure on Russia first has to be defended against accusations.
On 13 October Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, who chairs the European Parliament’s Committee on Security and Defence, called for military, organisational and financial support for Ukraine to be kept up and for sanctions pressure to be stepped up. In her view, it is pressure that will bring Moscow to serious negotiations. On the morning of 21 October, asked by Deutschlandfunk about the Oslo meeting, she was sceptical that it would make much impression on Putin, and said that Trump had hit “moral rock bottom”.
Meanwhile both the Kremlin and the White House were saying the process had never been closer to a conclusion.
It is hard to expect results from pressure when pressure is all that is on offer. On what terms? What commitments are the parties prepared to make? And how might Europe help see them through? Not a word. On all this, the loud speeches of those European politicians for whom Russia is nothing more than a way of shoring up their own popularity have nothing to say.
Passing moral judgement on the American president answers none of these questions. After years of estrangement this conversation is hard enough already, and treating every step towards the other side as suspect is a sure way of keeping alive every reason for the next round of recriminations.
Putting One’s Own House in Order
The image of an all-pervasive enemy also gets in the way of Europe’s own diplomacy. European politicians are left with a choice: rethink their favourite explanations, or treat anyone who tries to strike a deal as a suspect from the outset. The second option makes for an easier speech. It does nothing to end the war.
Europe does have something to bring to this table. The guarantees it is willing to give and to demand, for instance, or the terms on which it would resume trade with Russia.
Europeans are entitled to expect both security and a normal life from their leaders. An explanation in which Moscow is to blame for everything lets off the hook precisely the people who are supposed to answer to them.
Peace should not have to wait while European politicians go looking for someone else to blame.